Handling Multitude of Nash Equilibria in Voting Games
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Microsoft Research330 тыс
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28.07.16 – 2 15141:06Популярные
17 дней – 87448:11
Опубликовано 28 июля 2016, 2:10
Handling Multitude of Nash Equilibria in Voting Games Following an introduction to voting and to the Nash equilibrium concept we will present two papers which attempt to deal with the multitude of Nash equilibria in voting games in different ways. First, we will expand on an iterative process which enables us (or doesn't...) to reach a specific equilibrium in the game, under different voting systems and depending on various criteria. Further on, we examine some of the characteristics of the equilibria in simple plurality games, using empirical work, which we manage to examine by making a small, natural change to the voters' incentives, which turns out helps the game quite significantly.
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